

Processes of modernization

Scandinavian experiences

The BRICS countries are seen as emerging economic regimes.¹ In what sense are they also emerging normative regimes? To cope with this question, we should look at some underlying questions: Are there different modernization processes with different value systems? Multiple modernities, in what sense and to what degree? In short, processes of modernization, one or many?²

But then, how do we cope with those questions? I would say: we need a notion of modernity and modernization and we need to try it out on some relevant cases. That is what I shall try to do in this paper, looking at Scandinavian events and experiences.

Firstly, a note as to my conception of modernity and modernization: basically, I conceive “modernity” and “modernization” in terms of *various kinds of rationality*. In order to explicate the various kinds of rationality, it is convenient to start with *the various sciences and scholarly activities*: there are causally *explaining* disciplines, providing “means to an end”.³ There are *interpretive* disciplines, such as theology and jurisprudence.⁴ Moreover, in all scientific and scholarly disciplines there are *argumentative* activities, trying out the better arguments by taking counterarguments seriously. In short, there are different scientific and scholarly activities and hence there are different kinds of rationality, to be summarized by the terms explaining, interpretive, and argumentative.

Moreover, I conceive these various kinds of rationality as *action-based*⁵ and as *situated* in *agents* and *institutions*,⁶ in terms of different skills and different kinds of expertise. Hence, the various kinds of rationality are spread out into society at large, through education, professions, and technology, and also through numerous daily activities.

Two points should be added: (i) Argumentation is here conceived as a mutual search for better arguments, among participants who are at the same time fallible and serious. Hence, the kind of rationality at stake in such communicative and deliberative activities, includes a sense of *reasonableness* in coping with different reasons and in role-taking with the intent to better understand other persons and foreign perspectives.⁷ (ii) Conceived as activities, the various sciences include act-inherent (non-propositional) skills, often called “tacit knowing”⁸.

That is *how* I conceive modernity and modernization. But *why*? There are various conceptions of modernity and modernization, why this one? I have two reasons.

The first one is personal: As a philosopher of science, working on historically and pragmatically situated versions of reason and rationality,⁹ including pragmatic conceptions of argumentative reasoning, this is an approach that suits me well.

The second one is argumentative: Imagine that the various kinds of science and rationality were taken away. All of them. Starting with science-based technologies inherent in infrastructure and constructions, in media and communication technology, in energy supply and food production, in urbanization and transportation, followed up with legal institutions and administration, with various kinds of professional skills, ending with socio-political learning-processes and formative public discussions that are crucial for an enlightened and critical culture and thus for the formation of personal autonomy.¹⁰ If all of this were taken away, we may still talk about a “contemporary society”; but would it still make sense to call it a “modern

society”)? Most people would be reluctant to do so, I assume.

Then there is a further point: *argumentative rationality*, conceived in this way, is a common denominator underlying all scientific and science-based activities, and it is a final court of appeal for fallible and reasonable citizens who are confronted with different views and reasons, different claims and perspectives.

Consequently, there is a conclusion to be drawn, as to the question *one or many?* Firstly, modernity and modernization require all the various forms of reason and rationality. Secondly, an enlightened and self-critical argumentation underlies all of them. In this double sense, there is only *one* modernity. Note, this one-ness includes a plurality of disciplines and activities. In other words, already at the conceptual level there is a peculiar interplay of manifold and one-ness.

Multiple Theories of Modernity

So far, the brief note on my conception of modernity and modernization. Now, when discussing processes of modernization in this perspective, it is fair to say that we have to cope with what is *common and necessary* on the one hand and what is *special and contingent* on the other. However, in addition we have *deeply entrenched special experiences and learning-processes*: Different societies have gone through different historical crises and events that are deeply formative for the way they are modernized. Topography, material conditions, catastrophes, wars and inherent socio-cultural tensions, these are among the (more or less) contingent factors that make a difference to the collective identity, institutional arrangements and political culture of a society.¹¹

Hence, there are differences among modern societies. In order to illustrate this point,

we may look at some striking differences among Western nations, like France and the United States: their conceptions of the state–market relationship and of the role of religion in modern societies are strikingly different. In France (like in Germany and the Nordic countries), the State had a more dominant role in the processes of modernization than what was the cases in the U.S. (or U.K.). In France, “freedom of religion” predominantly meant (and means) a freedom to criticize religion whereas in the U.S. it primarily meant (and means) a freedom for various Protestant sects and other religious convictions to be left alone. Voltaire and the French philosophers of the Enlightenment operated in a different socio-cultural setting than the first European settlers of North America, and they promoted another intellectual culture that still prevails.

Selected cases: well entrenched events and experiences

Now the question: in trying out my conception of modernity and modernization on concrete cases, what kind of cases should we be looking for? We are looking for *entrenched* events and experiences that are deeply *formative* for these processes. How do we find them and how to conceptualize them? Tricky hermeneutic questions, for sure. My choice is the following: In looking for *special, well entrenched* events and experiences that are formative for modernization processes in that given society, I focus on *sudden events*, like war and crisis,¹² and on *persistent constellations*, like enduring class conflicts, socio-political learning-processes, and interplay between institutions and culture. These are the events and constellations that I shall look for in the Scandinavian case.

The Scandinavian Case:

Interplay between Lutheran State Officials and Successful Popular Movements

Scandinavian countries are seen as successful cases of modernization, with a high quality of life, with a high level of generalized trust and law-orientation, with a relatively egalitarian political culture, and as one of the few places where a generous and general welfare State is well functioning, with the support from all political parties, from the Left to the Right. How come?

Social scientists tend to talk about a “Scandinavian model” and in so doing they usually refer to the post WWII period. But apparently, these phenomena cannot be adequately conceived merely in terms of an economic or administrative model. To see what it is all about, and how it came about, we have to look for special, well-entrenched events and experiences in Scandinavian history. In so doing, I shall focus on Norwegian events and experiences in the nineteenth century, more precisely from the end of the Napoleonic wars in 1814 up to World War Two.

My question is now: What is typical for the Scandinavian countries throughout the nineteenth century? What did they have at that time, these countries, and no one else? My hunch is the following: They were run by Lutheran State officials! Where else was that the case? Only Prussia. But what did the Scandinavian country have, but not Prussia? My hunch is the following: Successful and politically progressive popular movements!

Thus, my hypothesis is the following: that which is typical for these countries in this period is *interplay between Lutheran State officials and successful popular movements*. This is what I shall focus on, as the historical background for special and well-entrenched events and experiences. I restrict myself to the Norwegian case.

Norway in Nineteenth Century, a “*Beamtenstaat*”

At the outset, a few facts about Norwegian history: In the eighteenth century, the monarchy of Denmark-Norway was a State under the rule of law, largely governed by enlightened State officials. A common school system was established in the 1730-s, one motivation being the promotion of literacy so that everybody could be able to read the Bible (which was required for the confirmation of Christian youth in Lutheranism). At the end of the eighteenth century, a large percentage of Norwegian farmers were landowners. Because of the Napoleonic Wars, Norway entered a union with Sweden in 1814, but with a newly written and progressive Constitution, and hence as a politically independent State (except for foreign affairs). At an early stage, due to the Black Death (in the fourteenth century), and later, due to the power-related politics of the Danish kings,¹³ the national nobility was fatally weakened – around 1814 there was practically no nobility in Norway. In 1814, as it regained its independence in a union with Sweden, Norway was in a miserable shape. The nation was thoroughly exhausted after the Napoleonic Wars and the British blockade. Practically all institutions necessary for a State were lacking. Broadly speaking, there were three main classes at that time (around 1814):

(i) State officials (around 0.2 per cent of the population), university-educated Lutheran theologians and lawyers, plus higher military officers, who became particularly influential for two reasons: there was no nobility, and these State officials were allowed to perform the double role as State servants and as active politicians. They were in general pro-enlightenment, in favor of modernizing the country top-down, by science-based expertise.

(ii) Citizenry, free from the influence of a nobility, often liberal in economic and cultural terms,¹⁴ with their living related to fishery, mines, mills, forestry, shipping and trade – in other words, they were not dependent on a landowning nobility.

(iii) Farmers (peasants) represented the majority of the population (about 90 per cent in 1814). To a large degree, they were literate; many were landowners (around 1814, approximately 57 per cent). The popular movements in the early nineteenth century emerged from this peasantry.

In short, at the beginning of the nineteenth century Norway was run by State officials, with a progressive Constitution, an independent citizenry, and a politically emerging peasantry.

The dominant State officials were university-educated jurists and theologians. Due to the need for new laws and institutions, the jurists had a decisive position. They were lawmakers, judges, State servants, and politicians. In addition, their most prominent leaders were enlightened and progressive intellectuals, and skilled and hard-working practitioners. They actively and efficiently promoted law-making and the rule of law, as well as a political and administrative use of empirical sciences; for instance, they furthered the institutional development and public use of statistics.

If the jurists were the most powerful, the theologians were the most numerous. They were State officials in a State with a Lutheran State religion, according to the Constitution. Most of them were clergymen, spread out into all regions of the nation, working as official spokesmen for the State Church (and hence for the State) and as educators and teachers, for instance as teachers and public examiners of the Lutheran confirmation, mandatory for all citizens, and they acted as supervisors of the common school system, also mandatory for everyone. Hence, at the outset (from 1814 onward) their influence was substantial. Moreover, the Lutheran clergy, as State servants, took part in administrative public work, for instance in registering information about births and deaths throughout the population, thus delivering useful statistical material to lawmakers and politicians. Furthermore, from the end of the

eighteenth century the Lutheran clergy of the Norwegian-Danish monarchy was to a large degree influenced by Enlightenment ideals, supporting not only literacy and general education for all citizens, but also promoting research and practical improvements. For instance, they promoted the cultivation of potatoes, a useful, nutritious product for a poor population – hence these defenders of the Enlightenment got the nickname of “potato priests”.

In the political realm, through the National Assembly (*Stortinget*), a democratic opposition, supported by the popular movements, gradually gained force. In 1884, Parliamentarianism was introduced by this opposition, an event that represented a decisive weakening of the political role of the State officials and the coming-to-power of the Left, supported by popular forces and by the radical intelligentsia. We shall look at some major aspects of the popular movements and their elites in Norway during this period.

Popular Movements and Elites

(1) Haugianism

Haugianism was the first popular movement, initiated by Hans Nielsen Hauge (1771–1824), a young farmer who had a religious vision while working in the field in 1796, at the age of twenty-five. He had read the Holy Scriptures, and according to his understanding, true Christian faith demands a pious and prudent life, different from the life of the upper class of State officials, including the clergymen. To spread his vision Hauge arranged religious meetings with his followers. However, there was a law forbidding popular meetings. For that reason, Hauge and the Haugians were prosecuted by the authorities. At the same time, according to the new constitution, laws were given (and changed) by the national assembly. Thus, the reasonable thing to do was to organize and act politically, seeking influence on the

legislation in the National Assembly. To do so, one had to be skilled and educated. One had to know how to organize, how to interpret legal texts, and how to argue for one's own interpretations. Hence, unintentionally, by implication, Haugianism became a socio-political movement. In short, Haugianism was at the same time a religious movement (within Lutheranism, against official Lutheranism), and a class movement against Lutheran State officials.

Max Weber identified Puritan ethics (Calvinism) as a precondition for capitalism.¹⁵ The Haugians played a similar role in Norway. For religious reasons they favored hard work and modest consumption. The result was capital accumulation and reinvestment – in paper mills, sawmills, salt production, fishery, shipbuilding, farming, and trade. Haugianism combined charismatic leadership and a national network of solidarity (between “brethren and sisters” – not individualistically).

The Haugians promoted modernizing activities and learning-processes on a broad scale: economic activities, socio-political organization, training in speaking in assemblies (women were welcome as both speakers and leaders), promoting literacy and thereby creating an alternative public sphere. For instance, approximately one-in-four Norwegian citizens, inclusive of newborn infants and the elderly, are said to have bought a copy of Hauge's writings in a time of hunger and hardship.

Haugianism soon became a breeding ground for political actors. They were members of the Constitution Assembly in 1814; they were elected to the National Assembly (*Stortinget*) and to political positions in local communities. By 1840 their main aims had been reached: wider religious and economic liberties.

Gradually Haugianism became integrated in Norwegian society. They remained within

the Lutheran State-Church; they did not redefine themselves as an independent religious community.

Hauge was harshly treated by the authorities – jailed in 1804 and finally released in 1811, physically weakened and with health problems. However, Haugianism as a movement prevailed and became quite influential. In many ways, it changed Norwegian society permanently, from below.

(2) The Thrane Movement

The Thrane Movement initiated by Marcus Thrane (1817–1890) in 1849 and inspired by the uprising in France in 1848, was at the outset a spontaneous protest against food shortages. In 1851, the Thrane movement was suppressed by the authorities (the State officials). Thrane was jailed. When released he did not take part in political activities, and after some time he left for the U.S. where he lived out the rest of his life. In a sense, the Thrane movement was but an episode – however, an important lesson was learnt: popular movements need to organize and they need an alternative public sphere! There was more to come.

(3) The Farmers' Friends

The Farmers' Friends (or 'people's friends': *bondevenn* or *folkevenn*), led by Søren Jaabæk (1814–1894) from around 1865, represents the third wave of popular movements, starting spontaneously and gradually gaining power by self-organization and self-education and by the use of an alternative public sphere. The farmers' friends organized themselves on all levels: locally, at the county level, and nationally, and they published a newspaper. In short, they defended their class interests and used the National Assembly to fight against the dominant

political position of the State officials, especially in the government – hence, the political fight for Parliamentarianism was an important one. In 1884, Parliamentarianism was introduced, after a hard fight.

Special Modernization Processes, Some General Points

I would like to emphasize a few points of general interest concerning these popular movements and their elites:

- They had an ability to *organize themselves*, and to *transfer* spontaneous popular movements into economic, political and educational institutions.¹⁶
- The main movements came in three waves, each time as a process in which spontaneous movements or actions became organized and institutionalized. What could not easily be realized in a singular simultaneous event could thus be obtained *by renewed processes*, from spontaneity to organization.
- These popular movements operated on a *broad scale*: in the economic field, on the political level, and in matters of education and formation.
- Deliberation and organizational work *were combined*.
- They discussed and organized *on all levels*, locally, regionally and nationally.
- They used the media of their time as an *alternative public sphere*.
- Education was conceived as *self-education*, an educational project that includes practical and theoretical training as well as *consciousness raising* on behalf of their identity and cultural background.
- The leaders of the popular movements behaved as civilized and reasonable persons. Thus, the interaction between politically active State officials and the leaders of the popular movements resulted in some basic *mutual trust*, despite hard political confrontations.¹⁷ Hence, when the State officials “abdicated” in 1884, they knew that nothing dramatic would happen to them or to the country. This kind of basic trust is a cultural precondition for a well-functioning democracy, requiring a peaceful change of power.
- All agents operated within the same Constitution and the same Confession. But there were both class struggle and *socio-cultural and linguistic differences*.¹⁸

The latter point deserves a special comment. Whereas many of the points referred to above may have equivalents in the other Nordic countries, there are some peculiar factors in the case of Norway, due to the *absence of national nobility* and the “*foreignness*” of the *State officials*: The Norwegian farmer was seen as the representative of the national heritage. Hence, the popular fight for democracy merged with the fight for recognition of the national heritage. We got a democratic nationalism, from below – probably a unique constellation. Whereas Norway developed a homogeneous political culture (how to do things), it remained somewhat heterogeneous in terms of cultural codes and identity formation.¹⁹

Furthermore, the popular movements tended to be pro-modern. That is, they *were pro-enlightenment* in the sense that they favored science and new technology as well as education and a progressive public sphere, and they were to a large degree progressive in social politics, in favor of improved working conditions and social security.

I recall some general points concerning the notion of rationality, with its paradigmatic division into *instrumental*, *interpretive*, and *argumentative rationality*, related to what has been said above, about these popular movements and their elites:

- (i) The Haugians promoted a capitalist economy and practical skills in various professions. In practical matters, these movements and their elites were in favour of modernized versions of *instrumental* rationality.
- (ii) Opposing the legal restrictions and the theological interpretations handed down by the upper class of State officials, the Haugians developed *interpretive* skills concerning religious as well as legal texts.
- (iii) By opposing those in power, and by defending their own theological and legal

interpretations “bottom up”, members of the popular movements acquired *argumentative* skills. (Those at the top were university-educated theologians and jurists who in principle were sensible to reasonable arguments, even though they had another socio-political position.) Moreover, we have the founding and usage of alternative public spheres and educational activities in a setting of “arguing uphill” and thus acquiring a reflective attitude; such an attitude is more easily acquired by those coming from below than by the ones at top who are not used to seeing themselves from the outside. The next step, and the more complex one, is the acquisition of a self-critical awareness of an unavoidable variety of worldviews, or at least a self-critical awareness of mutual fallibility and thus, of a need for corrections and improvements. However, this kind of reflective and self-critical awareness is usually a fruit of later stages in the processes of modernization.

All in all, it seems fair to say that in their practices, these movements and their elites did promote modernization processes in a blend of instrumental, interpretive, and argumentative rationality. One of the questions, is then the following: Could these processes, roughly similar across the Nordic countries, explain the fact that these countries, in the mid-twentieth century, were able to combine a generous and general welfare system and economic redistribution with a relatively egalitarian political culture, and a high degree of trust, both in other persons and in public institutions and procedures, and a high degree of law-orientation? At least we can say this: there are some deep-rooted processes in the history of the Nordic countries that are peculiar to these countries, such as the interplay between Lutheran State officials and successful popular movements. Moreover, it is worthwhile recalling that the productive ideas

and ideals were to a large degree acquired and elaborated bottom up. They were practice-based, rather than theory-driven. For instance, Marxist theories came late, and they were not politically decisive.

Future challenges, for all of us

These are main elements from the historical background of the supposedly successful Scandinavian experiences. However, today we are all faced with major and intertwined challenges. Here are some brief reminders: (i) Political and economic institutions are operating with short-term perspectives – be it democracy without the votes and voices of future generations, be it capitalism motivated by short-term exchange values – in contrast to long-term concern of future generations and other living species. (ii) The relationship between politics and various kinds of expertise has become increasingly complex and challenging, institutionally and intellectually. (iii) Scientific and technological developments, not least in the life sciences, present new challenges, intellectually and morally as well as politically and institutionally. (iv) Demographical trends and increased consumption, taken together, are not sustainable, indicating future crises and conflicts. (v) Due to a blend of politics and religion, we once again have a constellation of pre-modern attitudes and modern technology and weaponry, reminiscent of the 1930s, though with even more advanced technology, including atomic, biological and chemical means of destruction.

Consequently, whatever could be learnt from Scandinavian experiences and modernization processes in the past, it has to be seen in this perspective: that of present and future challenges, also for the Scandinavian countries.

What could be learnt?

These future challenges taken into consideration, what could be learnt from the Scandinavian case? At first, recall some main points: in the Norwegian case, we had enlightenment and education, well-established institutions, self-organization and participation, a diverse public sphere and public transparency, state of law and law-orientation, egalitarian political culture and general solidarity, a basic trust in other persons and institutions, moderate socio-economic differences, and hardly any ethnic or religious differences. However, democracy with universal franchise did not come at once, say in 1814, but gradually, along with these developments.²⁰

Some of these factors are rather accidental, such as the ethnic and religious homogeneity of the population,²¹ and therefore hard to reproduce under different conditions. Other factors are hard to reproduce by political means alone, such as the self-organization of the popular movements. Nevertheless, to my mind, there are still some lessons to be learnt, in the sense that they represent arrangements that could be promoted politically: (i) A well functioning modern society, and especially a modern democracy, presupposes *education* and *enlightenment*, including a scientific and intellectual culture with a self-critical interplay between all the major scientific and scholarly disciplines, and therefore also an enlightened critique of religion.²² (ii) A modern and decent society presupposes adequate and well functioning *public institutions*, including an open and enlightened public sphere. (iii) A modern and decent society presupposes a *state of law*, making transparency and predictability possible and thus counteracting corruption and nepotism. (iv) A modern and decent society presupposes and promotes *moderate socio-economic differences*.

The emerging economic regimes represent peculiar cases of modernizations, according to their own cultural and geo-political preconditions, with some common features and each

with their own special characteristics – just as Norway and the Nordic countries represent alternative processes of modernization. Under these conditions, whether or not we may learn from each other in a direct sense, by adopting special solutions and arrangements, it is nevertheless useful to know each other and to be aware of the variety of ways of coping with common and peculiar challenges of the modern world.

General points

At the very end, there are some general points worth recalling:

(1) There are *various* modernization processes, and in that sense, *multiple modernities*. Even so, there are also *common* preconditions concerning institutional developments and the role of scientific and scholarly rationality and practical reasonableness.

(2) These processes often take some time. *Not everything can come at once*. For instance, a stable and well-functioning democracy can hardly be installed without some presuppositions, such as a reasonable degree of education and enlightenment, basic legal institutions and social justice, and moderate socio-economic differences. However, the way of doing it, and the time it takes, may vary a lot.

(3) Modernity and modernization require various forms of rationality and reasonableness, situated in agents and institutions, not to forget interpretive and argumentative rationality and reasonableness. In this sense, modernity and modernization are neither Western nor Eastern. In this sense, there is *only one modernity*, and in this respect, there is no way back from the modern predicament.

(4) Moreover, in our time we realize that all contemporary societies are confronted with *deep challenges*, from the inside as well as from the outside.²³ The future depends on how rationally

and reasonably, we are able cope with these challenges.

References

- Arnason, J.P., S.N. Eisenstadt and B. Wittrock. 2005. *Axial Civilizations and World History*. Leiden: Brill.
- Eisenstadt, S. 2000. *Comparative Civilizations and Multiple Modernities*, v. 1–2 (especially v. 2). Leiden/Boston: Brill.
- Gilje, N. 1997. “Hans Nielsen Hauge and the Spirit of Capitalism”. In Fjelland et al. (eds.). *Philosophy Beyond Borders*. Bergen: SVT Press, pp. 255–69.
- Rian, Ø. 2007. *For Norge, kjempers fødeland*. Oslo: Det norske samlaget.
- Skirbekk, G. 1993. *Rationality and Modernity*. Oslo/Oxford: Scandinavian University Press/Oxford University Press.
- 1996. “The Idea of a Welfare State in a Future Scenario of Great Scarcity”. In Eriksen and Loftager (eds.) *The Rationality of the Welfare State*. Oslo: Scandinavian University Press.
 - 2006. “Religion and Modernity”. In G. Skirbekk *Religion, Modernity, and Rationality*. Bergen: SVT Press.
 - 2007. *Timely Thoughts*. Lanham: University Press of America.
 - 2011. *Multiple Modernities. A Tale of Scandinavian Experiences*. Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press.
- Skirbekk G. et al. (eds.). 1992. *The Commercial Ark. A Book on Evolution, Ecology, and Ethics*. Oslo: Scandinavian University Press.

Notes

¹ BRICS: Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa.

² In my case, it really started as a collaboration with Chinese friends and colleagues, discussing questions of cultural modernization in Europe and East Asia. (This collaboration became formalized in 1994, in terms of an exchange programme between East China Normal University in Shanghai and the University of Bergen in Norway, called “Marco Polo”.) What does it mean to be “modern”? To be Chinese and modern? Western and modern? Is there, basically, just one way of being modern? Or are there “multiple modernities”. (Cf. Eisenstadt 2000; Arnason et al. 2005.) And what do we mean when talking about “the West”? The U.S. or Europe? Northern Europe or Southern Europe, Eastern or Western Europe? Thus I began writing papers on Scandinavian modernization processes. These writings resulted in a book called *Multiple Modernities. A Tale of Scandinavian Experiences*, published by the Chinese University Press, Hong Kong 2011. In the present paper I highlight some main points in that book.

³ Cf. Hempel’s joint concept of explanation, prediction, and technical maxim, in Hempel, C. G. 1949. „The Function of General Law in History“. In *Readings in Philosophical Analysis*, eds. H. Feigl and W. Sellars. New York: Appleton-Century-Crafts: 459-71.

⁴ Those working in the natural sciences are also interpreting texts and utterances within their field, thus there are interconnections between the various disciplines and the various kinds of rationality.

⁵ In philosophical terms: conceived pragmatically, not merely semantically.

⁶ Cf. Max Weber (and Jürgen Habermas), conceiving modernization as interplay between “value spheres” (different kinds of validity-claims) and “institutions”.

⁷ On human fallibilism and the need for discussion and for listening to counterarguments, cf. J.S. Mill (1859). *On Liberty*. London: Penguin, 2010, and Karl Popper. *Conjectures and Refutations*. London: Routledge, 1963.

⁸ Cf. Zhenhua Yu. *On the Tacit Dimension of Human Knowledge*. University of Bergen: Bergen, 2006. Along the same lines, there are act-inherent skills in *socio-political learning processes*. They too should be considered when we talk about rationality and reasonableness inherent in processes of modernization.

⁹ E.g., the history of western thought (conceived as modernization processes) and a meliorist and case-oriented version of transcendental pragmatics. Cf. Skirbekk and Gilje, *A History of Western Thought*, 2001, and Skirbekk, *Rationality and Modernity*, 1993.

¹⁰ Societies without an enlightened citizenry, capable of an enlightened critique of religion (in a Kantian sense), are not to be conceived as modern societies, according to this conception of modernity and modernization. Cf. the situation in countries like Iran and Saudi Arabia, and in large segments of the U.S. This is a politically important point, considering the political stalemate of these countries.

¹¹ Moreover, there is an interrelationship between institutions and culture. In short, cultural values and personal virtues that are appropriate in clan-based societies are dysfunctional in modern societies with well-functioning and independent legal and socio-economic institutions.

¹² By Björn Wittrock called “crystalizing” events, cf. *Thesis Eleven* 77 2004, p. 49.

¹³ Cf. Rian 2007.

¹⁴ Cf. Ibsen’s Nora, and *The Enemy of the People*.

¹⁵ Gilje 1997.

¹⁶ For instance, the organizational ability of the women’s movement was demonstrated in 1905, when Norway unilaterally broke the union with Sweden. Only male citizens were allowed to vote for or against the union. Women citizens were not allowed to vote. Hence, they organized their own “private” vote for women. In a two-week period, the number of women who had voted was two-thirds of the male votes, in a topographically difficult country with a widely scattered population, before e-mail and mobile phones – an amazingly high number.

¹⁷ The slogan in favor of parliamentarianism louted: “All power in this hall”, as a defence for democracy. Among leading State officials this was seen as an attack on the constitutional principle of the tripartite division of power.

¹⁸ Compared with a politically centralized and culturally and linguistically homogenized country like France, Norway may look like an early “post-modernist” society with an inherent “multi-culturalism” – that is, cultural heterogeneity (within a political homogeneity).

¹⁹ The topography of the country may also have contributed to this heterogeneity.

²⁰ The right to vote for women: 1911 in Finland, 1913 in Norway.

²¹ In addition, there is the decisive fact that the Scandinavian countries were (are) small in size, and therefore relatively easy to unite and organize.

²² In a Kantian sense of purification, not rejection (cf. Kant’s critique of pure and practical reason).

²³ Cf. the two last chapters in Skirbekk 2011.